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THE THEORY OF CAPITAL IN VIRGINIA:
AN HISTORICAL COMMA
AND A DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTION
CHARLEs R. McDOWELL*

For some years Virginia lawyers have discussed, in an academic sort
of way, problems concerning the true meaning of the dividend section
of the Virginia Corporation Statute. One of the moot questions has
been: Does the statute permit a corporation, operating under a continuing capital deficit, to pay dividends out of net earnings for the current fiscal year without either restoring net assets to the level of capital,
or reducing capital stock in the manner prescribed by the statute? The
question has frequently taken some such form as. this: Suppose a Virginia corporation was launched in 1930 with a stated capital of $Ioo,ooo and with $looooo worth of net assets; that it has had five lean
years, losing on the average $io,ooo of its net assets each year for five
consecutive years, thereby winding up the fifth year with a 5o% capital
impairment, or a $5o,ooo capital deficit; but that during its sixth year,
its business has taken a turn for the better, and the books show $io,ooo
net earnings for 1935; does the Virginia statute permit the $1o,ooo to
be distributed to shareholders as dividends, without restoration of
capital or reduction of capital stock? Some have contended that the
statute clearly permits a solvent corporation to make a distribution
upon the basis of "net earnings" for the sixth year, regardless of the
shortage of net assets to measure up to stated capital.' Others have refused to believe that the dividend section of the Virginia Corporation
Statute was intended to abolish, so far as it ever existed, the whole requirement of maintaining a fixed capital as a condition -to the right to
pay dividends.
The dividend section of the statute reads as follows:
"Directors are empowered to declare and pay dividends out
of net earnings, or out of net assets in excess of capital ....1
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has never passed upon the
problem of whether dividends can be paid out of such "net earnings"
as only go to decrease a capital deficit. 2 The United States Circuit
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, School of Law.
Wa. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 3840.
2United States v. Biely, 169 F. (2d) 542 (C. C. A. 4th, 1948).
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Court of Appeals, however, in United States v. Riely,3 has recently held
that the Virginia statute does permit a Virginia corporation with impaired capital to pay dividends out of net earnings for the current year.
The occasion for the federal court making an interpretation of the
Virginia Corporation Statute was a tax refund case. The taxpayer,
Pierce Oil Corporation, had paid an undistributed profits tax under
protest. The ground of the protest was that the taxpayer did not owe
the amount of the undistributed profits tax unless it could have made
a legal distribution for the year the tax was assessed, 1937, and that
the taxpayer could not have legally made a distribution for 1937 because it began and ended the year with a heavy capital deficit. 4 The
plaintiff, receiver for the Pierce Oil Corporation, 5 recovered a judgment for the amount paid, in the Federal District Court,6 that court
expressing the view that whether the plaintiff owed the amount of the
tax depended upon whether it could legally have made a distribution,
which in turn depended upon whether the Virginia statute permitted a
corporation with impaired capital to make a distribution. The District
Court held that the statute did not permit a capital-deficit company to
pay dividends. The Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the theory that
the duty to pay the tax depended upon the legality of the corporation
making a distribution for 1937, but reversed the District Court upon
the ground that the Virginia statute expressly permits a capital-deficit
corporation to pay dividends out of net earnings for the current year.
Although the Riely case may arouse little interest among tax counsel
because the undistributed profits tax is no longer effective as such, 7 it is
nevertheless a significant case in the corporations field, since it goes to
the heart of the problem of what constitutes the capital of a corporation
incorporated under Virginia law. The case is especially significant for
the reason that the judge who happened to write the opinion is a distinguished expert on Virginia law.8 In the absence of a decision of the
sUnited States v. Riely, 169 F. (2d) 542 (C. C. A. 4th, 1948).
'Net earnings computed under Revenue Act of 1936 were $86,412.46. The corporation's capital was impaired on Dec. 31, 1936 by at least $1,149,642.76, and on
Dec. 31, 1947 by at least Si,ooo,ooo. See Pierce Oil Co. v. United States, 77 F. Supp.
273 (E. D. Va. 1947).
6The Pierce Oil Corporation was dissolved by decree of the Circuit Court of
the City of Richmond, entered Dec. 27, 1940, and in April, 194o, Henry C. Riely and
Robert T. Barton were appointed Receivers. See United States v. Riely, 169 F. (2d)
542 (C. C. A. 4th, 1948).
6
Pierce Oil Co. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 273 (E. D. Va. 1947).
7
For current tax relief under undistributed profits tax see: Revenue Act of 1936,
Sec. 26 (c), as amended by Revenue Act of 1942, Sec. 501 (a) (2).
"Armistead M. Dobie, formerly Dean of the Department of Law of the University of Virginia.
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Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, the opinion in the Riely case will
perhaps be accepted as an authoritative interpretation of the dividend
section of the Virginia statute, so long as the law remains unamended.
The far-reaching result of the decision is that there is no such
thing as a fixed capital requirement for Virginia corporations. All Virginia corporations are practically reduced to the status of wasting assets corporations. When it comes to paying dividends, the only thing
left which a solvent Virginia corporation cannot do is to pay a liquidating dividend out of a bare remnant of its impaired capital while
operating as a going concern.
Under general rules of corporation law, as found in textbooks, 9
treatises, 0 cases,"1 and articles,' 2 a corporation is not permitted to pay
dividends out of current net earnings while its capital is impaired without restoring capital or reducing capital stock. "Net earnings" accruing
while capital is impaired are looked upon as mere decreases of capital
deficit' 3 and not as "net earnings" for dividend purposes. Under current

theories of corporate finance and accepted accounting practice, the
only source of legal dividends is found in the excess of net assets over
capital. A corporation capitalized at $ioo,ooo is required to keep $Ioo,ooo more than barely solvent as a condition to paying dividends. Typical statutes, including the Virginia statute, 14 impose drastic penalties
upon directors for paying dividends out of capital-meaning paying
dividends out of "net assets" which do not measure up to their fixed
capital margin-and the same statutes require innocent recipients of
such dividends to return the illegal payments to the corporation, or
else impose liability on the shareholder to the creditor, in case of insolvency, to the extent illegal dividends have been received.
Such statutory provisions do not concern themselves with insolvent
corporations paying dividends or with corporations paying dividends
which render them insolvent, but concern themselves with infringe0"Only a few States permit payment of dividends out of current earnings."
Ballantine, Corporations (Rev. ed. 1946) 573.
0ii Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Rev. ed. 1931) § 5335, P. 838.
I'll Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Rev. ed. 1931) § 5335, p. 839, n. 95.
"In Ballantine & Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Dividends
Under Modem Corporation Laws (1935) 23 Calif. L. Rev. 229, 239, the following
summary appears: "(i) The most frequent limitation is that dividends are payable
out of surplus .... (2) In a few states the surplus requirement is somewhat more
carefully restricted ...[to] 'earned surplus.' .. -(3) In a few jurisdictions, dividends are payable either from accumulated surplus, or in the absence of a requisite
surplus, from net profits for some particular accounting period...."
23National Newark & Essex Banking Co. v. Durant Motor Co., 124 N. J. Eq. 213,
i A (2d) 316 (1938).
2AVa. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 384o.
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ment of the capital margin over and above solvency. A corporation
capitalized at one million dollars, which has net assets of five cents is
still ioo% solvent. So, too, is a naked Indian with no assets and no
liabilities (because he has no credit). Unless no liability is to take the
place of limited liability in America, continuing solvency seems a poor
test for the propriety of paying dividends.
Under prevailing corporation law and by accepted accounting
practice, "capital is a quantum and not a res." 15 In practical application it becomes a mere numerical figure which is to be subtracted from
the numerical figure standing for the money value of "net assets," in
order to ascertain the numerical figure representing the money value
of "legal surplus" available for legal dividend payments. The capital
figure is a constant and not a variable. The figure representing net assets varies, but capital remains a constant unless the charter is amended.
In terms of the inevitable graph, expressing dollar values in terms of
inches, $1o,ooo to the inch, when capital is $ioo,ooo, the capital line is
ten inches above the solvency line. When net assets drop to $50,000,
the net assets stand half-way between the capital line and the solvency
line and the graph shows a 50% capital deficit. If net assets rise to $1 lo,ooo, the net assets stand one inch above the capital line and the graph
shows $io,ooo "surplus." Net assets rise and fall, but capital remains a
constant until reduced by amendment of the charter. Capital does not
fold up like an accordian, under general rules of corporation law; but
under the Virginia statute, as interpreted by the Riely case, capital is
not a constant. It is something that shrivels and shrinks as the net assets diminish. Presumably a corporation could be launched with a
capital of $ioo,ooo and net assets of $ioo,ooo, lose all of its net assets
the first year (ending the year nakedly solvent) and yet, if it had net
earnings of $ioo,ooo the second year, it could distribute the whole
amount of net earnings for the year as dividends, and begin the third
year nakedly solvent.
In the Riely case, the court begins with the proposition that the
case must be decided solely upon the provisions of the Virginia statute
and not upon general corporation law. Certainly no one will take issue
with the proposition that the Virginia statute controls.16 In the second
place, no one can deny that the Commonwealth of Virginia has the
power to pass a law which abolishes the fixed capital requirement. Nor
can any living man deny that the framers of the Virginia statute may
possibly have intended to do just that. Some Virginia lawyers may dis15Hills, Model Corporation Act (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1334.
1iiFletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Rev. ed. 1931) § 5334.
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sent, however, from the method by which the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals arrived at its interpretation of the Virginia statute, and may
remain unconvinced that the law has been correctly interpreted, no
matter what degree of respect the high court which decided the Riely
case deservedly commands.
Some Virginia lawyers had assumed that the dividend section of
the Virginia Corporation Statute, when read in connection with other
provisions thereof, made "excess of net assets over capital" the only
legal source of a dividend. Though the statute reads ". . . out of net

earnings or net assets in excess of capital," they had assumed that the
statute meant "...

-

out of such net earnings as should constitute an

excess of net assets over fixed stated capital or, to put it another way,
out of any excess of net assets over and above capital whether carried
as surplus or not." They were familiar with the fact that "net earnings"
is an ambiguous expression, which may vary in meaning with the context. To them, "net earnings" for a given fiscal year in the broadest
sense included two types: (i) net earnings which only decrease a capital deficit, (2) net earnings which create or augment a surplus. They
had assumed that "net earnings" as used in the dividend section of the
Virginia statute excluded the former and included the latter. They
were not entirely presumptuous in this assumption, because other jurisdictions had interpreted similar statutory forms of expression in that
manner. It seemed to be an accepted interpretation of the type of expression found in the Virginia statute.1 7 Other Virginia lawyers have
pointed out that "net earnings" has been frequently used to mean net
earnings for the whole period of a corporation's life, as distinguished
from net earnings for a particular year (or particular accounting
period). If a corporation has never paid a dividend, "over-all period
net earnings" and "surplus" are the same thing. For example, suppose
a corporation launched in 1931, fairly capitalized at $ioo,ooo, lost
$1o,ooo in 1931 and another $io,ooo in 1932. In 1933 it earned $3o,ooo.
At the end of 1933, assuming there have been no dividend payments,
the company's "surplus" is $io,ooo; its over-all net earnings are also
$io,ooo and its excess of net assets over capital is -$io,ooo. They point
out that the Virginia statute does not say that dividends may be paid
out of "net 'earnings for the current year," but that the statute reads
".out of net earnings, or net assets in excess of capital."
There are, therefore, two theories of the.meaning of "net earnings"
in the Virginia dividend section which are consistent with the maintenance of the integrity of a fixed capital margin: (i) that the refer17Balantine, Corporations (Rev. ed. 1946) 585.
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ence is to over-all net earnings for the whole period of the corporation's
life, thereby making "net earnings" synonymous with "surplus;" (2)
that "net earnings," though actually referring to net earnings for the
particular fiscal year, is used in the narrow sense of net earnings which
create or augment a surplus, and not in the broad sense including annual "net earnings" which only go to reduce a capital deficit.
The only theory of the meaning of "net earnings," as employed in
the Virginia dividend section, which is destructive of the whole fixed
capital requirement is the theory that the words "net earnings" are
used in the sense of net earnings for the fiscal year rather than for the
over-all period, and also that the term is used in the broadest sense to
include capital deficit decreases, as well as net earnings which create or
augment surplus. It seems not only undesirable to destroy the fixed
capital requirement in Virginia, when it is so nearly universally maintained in most of the great industrial states, but the achievement of
such a destructive result requires the violation of accepted rules of
interpretation of statutes of the Virginia type, a statute which we largely borrowed from New Jersey. Courts of other states, when obliged to
interpret similar statutes, had not so interpreted their statutes as to
produce such a radical result as destroying the fixed capital requirement. Why, may we ask, did a high federal court feel obliged to secede
the Commonwealth of Virginia from the Union of conventional corporation law? The answer seems to be found in the punctuation, an
historical comma, producing a disjunctive conjunction.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals tells us that the Virginia
statute makes an express grant of power to the Board of Directors of
a Virginia corporation to pay dividends out of either of two entirely
separate and independent sources: (i) out of "net assets" in excess of
capital, or in the alternative (2) out of the "net earnings" for the current fiscal year (regardless of whether the corporation has a capital
deficit or not).
The language of the court, concerning the meaning of net earnings,
is as follows:
"The words 'net earnings' are followed by a comma, then before
the words 'out of its net assets in excess of capital' comes the disjunctive conjunction 'or.' As the English language is rationally
used, this would seem to imply two separate sources of dividends (i) net earnings and (2) excess of assets over capital,
each with no relation to, no connection with the other. To arrive at the interpretation reached by the Federal District Court,
it is necessary to insert in the Statute, right after the words net
earnings some such non-existing negative proviso as 'provided
there is an excess of corporate assets over capital.' "
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Thus we observe the whole law of a fixed capital requirement in
the Commonwealth of Virginia demolished by a "disjunctive conjunction" which derives its powerful disjoining effect from the position of
a comma. The whole battle for the integrity of the capital margin is
lost "all because of a horse-shoe nail" of punctuation. Certainly such
a comma is worth looking into very carefully. We may approach the
study of such commas by the case method, in order to test their effect
in similar English sentences having nothing to do with law. Suppose we
pick up a high school student's mathematics manual and read the following words: "The area of a circle is Pi R 2, or 3.1416 multiplied by
the square of the radius." De we assume that the comma before the
word "or" makes the word "or" a disjunctive conjunction and that it
compels us to decide that .two separate and independent methods of
arriving at the area of a circle are intended? On the other hand, do we
not assume that the "or" is an ordinary*signal of an explanatory appositive? Is it incorrect to use the comma? If so, it must be under some
new Federal Rule of Punctuation.
Suppose we turn the problem around in order to see whether the
word "or" may be a disjunctive conjunction in a similar sentence, without the aid of the comma. We read a note from our hostess: "You can
find sugar in the breakfast room in the sugarbowl or in the tin box in
the pantry." De we assume that only one source of sugar is intended because the comma is omitted after the word bowl? It is wrong to omit
the comma?
Suppose a section of a given statute defines "surplus" in the broad
sense "all excess of 'net assets over capital,' whether carried as 'surplus'
on the books or not." Following the definition appears the following
statement as to dividend payments: "Dividends may be paid out of
surplus, or excess of net assets over capital." In such case, would we assume two separate and independent sources of a dividend? Would the
"or" be disjunctive? Would it be incorrect to put the comma after the
word surplus? Would not the comma simply indicate that a parenthetical explanatory clause is to follow? It is submitted that the comma in
the dividend section of the Virginia statute is a neutral element in our
problem of interpretation.
But the comma in the Riely case is an historical comma. The fixed
capital requirement in New Jersey was temporarily sent to the junk
heap in 1904 because a similar comma was held to have created a disjunctive conjunction in the dividend section of the New Jersey corporation statute. In Goodnow v. The American Writing Paper Corn-
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court permitted a corporation, launched with a
a dividend without either restoring capital or
upon the theory that the comma in the followindicated alternative sources of dividends:

from its surplus [comma] or from its 'net profits.'" The New Jer-

sey court said: "Under the Act of 1896 there was room to contend that
the words net profits were intended to be synonymous with the word
surplus; the language used was-from surplus or net profits. Under
the Act of 1904 this contention is no longer possible; the language used
is: 'from its surplus, (comma) or from its net profits.' The evident intention of the change is to point out two funds from which dividends
may be paid." Joseph L. Weiner, in commenting on the Goodnow case
in the Columbia Law Review, 19 says: "... the court said that the
Amendment, by adding the comma, between surplus and net profits,
made clear that these two measures of the propriety of a dividend were
not synonymous but alternative. Whatever we may think of the New
Jersey court's theory of the effect of the comma, the opinion shows
dearly that such expressions as net earnings and net profits were sometimes used in the early statutes synonymously with surplus, and the
court admits that, absent the atomic comma, there was room to contend that net profits meant overall-period net profits and was therefore
synonymous with surplus." The language of the court, in the Riely
case, is strangely reminiscent of the language of the court in the Goodnow case but the Goodnow case has been discredited in New Jersey, the
jurisdiction from which we borrowed our basic statute.
In a recent New Jersey case, National Newark & Essex Banking Co.
v. DurantMotor Co.,20 the court denied that dividends could be earned
while the corporation was operating under a capital deficit. Under the
charter contract, the holders of so-called non-cumulative preferred
stock were entitled to no dividend credits for passed-over years "unless
earned" but were entitled to dividend credits for passed-over years "if
earned." "Net earnings" of the type which decrease a capital deficit did
accrue during the period in question but there were no "net earnings"
of the type which create or augment a surplus. No dividend credits
were allowed for years in which the net earnings went only to decrease
a capital deficit. The court said: "From the beginning of operations
Dec. 1, 1931 to Dec. 31, 1937, there was a loss of $232,ooo; assume that
'873 N. J. Eq. L. 692, 69 Ad. 1014 (198o).
"Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law, American Statutes and
Cases (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 461, 469.
20124 N. J. Eq. 213, 1 A. (2d) 316 (1938).
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there will be a profit of $50,000 for 1938, reducing the deficit that much.

Would the preferred stock earn a dividend in 1938? Our statute forbids payment of dividends except from surplus or from net profits of
the business of the corporations-Though the company be $5oooo
better off at the close of 1938 than at the beginning yet there will be no
net profits at the end of the year but only a smaller deficit." In terms
of law-student slang, where "earnings" below the solvency line are earnings in the red, and earnings above the capital line are earnings in the
black, and earnings in the capital-deficit zone are earnings in the pink,
we may say that this case holds that earnings in the pink are not earnings for dividend purposes. The mercury in the thermometer was rising toward the melting point but hadn't risen to 32 degrees.
Mr. Henry W. Ballantine, one of the most highly respected authorities on corporation law, in the 1946 edition of his textbook, in commenting on the Goo.dnow case, says: "It may be doubted whether the
New Jersey Legislature really intended to create alternative sources of
dividends by referring to net profits without specifying any particular
period for their determination. In most of the statutes in which the
terms surplus or net profits are employed without specifying some particular accountifhg period for net profits, particularly where impairment of capital is prohibited, it is believed that no alternative sources
of dividends are intended. The purpose of using the terms in the alternative seenis to be to include all excess of net assets over the amount
of legal capital, whether carried on the books in a surplus account or
otherwise." 21 It should be recalled at this point that the Virginia statute
does prohibit payment of dividends out of capital and does prescribe
severe penalties on Board members for paying dividends out of capital. 22 It should also be kept in mind that the Virginia statute includes
a very elaborate procedure for reducing capital stock. 23 It is diffcult to
imagine why anyone should take the trouble to comply with this section of the statute if capital, instead of being a constant, shrivels or
shrinks or reduces itself automatically as net assets dwindle away. If a
corporation is launched with $iooooo stated capital and $ioo,ooo net
assets, why bother to reduce capital stock, in the manner prescribed
by statute, when capital automatically reduces itself to $5o,ooo as
soon as $5o,ooo of the net assets are lost.
There are three different provisions of the Virginia corporation
statute which seem to be utterly inconsistent with the interpretation of
Ballantine, Corporations (Rev. ed. 1946) 583, 584.
nVa. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 384o.
2Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 3781.
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the Riely case: (1) the provision against paying dividends out of capital; (2) the penalties imposed upon directors for paying dividends out
of capital; (3) the provisions for making a reduction of capital stock.
While it is possible to argue that paying dividends out of capital
means "paying dividends out of the remnant of capital, as impaired,
when there are no current net earnings," the writer can imagine no
useful purpose for the section in the Virginia statute providing an exact procedure for reducing capital stock, when capital reduces itself as
net assets dwindle away.
Lawyers who experience some degree of shock as well as surprise at
the decision in the Riely case will perhaps read the opinion carefully,
feeling between the lines to try to learn whether the court rejected the
fixed capital requirement for Virginia reluctantly or not. They will
want to know whether the court felt driven to an admittedly unfortunate result by a bad statute, or whether, on the other hand, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals felt that it did not make much difference
whether Virginia corporations or any other corporations were governed
by a fixed capital requirement. Such lawyers will not have to feel between the lines. They will be told in unambiguous, forthright English in black and white that the court does not think the fixed capital
requirement amounts to much one way or another. This may be of
some interest to lawyers outside Virginia: The words of the court on
the matter are as follows: "Let us suppose, however, that (absent any
statute) a corporation starts with a capital of $ioo,ooo. After several
difficult years, the corporation's assets are reduced to $9o,ooo. There
are no creditors and there is ample cash to carry on the corporation's
business. Now comes a good year in which the corporation's net earnings are $5,ooo. We believe that if the directors in their sound discretion so determine, there is no compelling reason in corporate finance
or economic practice, which would prevent the directors from declaring
a $5,ooo dividend for the stockholders. Surely this would not be a very
unusual performance. For the rule in England, see 55 A. L. R. 2o."
The court's illustration presents such a mild case of paying dividends
out of capital that one is made to feel guilty of petty-mindedness to
object. One wonders if the court is announcing a policy of temperance,
as distinguished from total abstinence, in dipping into capital's bowl
for a little Virginia Gentleman's drink of dividends. Under the actual
decision of the case, however, a corporation could lose all its net assets
and be reduced to naked solvency and yet pay dividends the first year
its books showed any net earnings of the type which go to reduce a
deficit.
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Now certainly no one has any right to feel shocked on moral
grounds on learning that one of the highest courts in the United States
has flouted the fixed capital requirement or because it has expressed
the view that the strict maintenance of a fixed capital is of little or no
importance. Certainly no question of morals or basic propriety is involved. America would continue to run and even prosper, perhaps,
with or without its corporations being required to maintain a fixed
capital. We have had corporations in England, without limited liability; 24 we have had American corporations whose stockholders were
subject to ratable liability;2 5 and we have had corporations with a
capital that shrank as net assets diminished. We have survived an era
when stock-watering was the fashionable thing to do, even for gentlemen. We have survived the era of true no-par stock. We could survive
an era when American corporations generally were permitted to
operate without any requirement of maintaining a fixed capital. Perhaps most good citizens would never be conscious of any change. In
this sense, there is no compelling reason for maintaining the requirement of a fixed capital margin. But to say that there is no compelling
reason in corporate finance or in economic practice for maintaining
the capital margin, as the law exists today, is quite another thing. It
had seemed,to some lawyers that the capital margin requirement was
the most all-pervading principle in the law of corporate finance, as
omnipresent as the rule requiring consideration in the law of contracts.
The following illustrations indicate that much of the law of corporate finance rotates around the axis of fixed capital rather than the
solvency line. 1. When may a corporation purchase its own stock, we
ask the student of corporate finance. The answer is, when the purchase
can be made out of surplus.2 6 The answer is not when the purchase
will not render the corporation insolvent. 2. May holders of preferred
stock which is convertible into bonds exercise their conversation privilege (thereby transforming themselves into creditors of the corporation rather than shareholders in the debtor company) whenever the
conversion will not render the corporation insolvent? The taught-law
answer is no.27 There must be a, surplus. Capital must not be impaired.
3. To what extent may cumulative preferred stock be "guaranteed?"
Answer: Only to the extent that there be a surplus at the time of pay24 Machem, Modem Law of Corporations (19o8) 9.
23See discussion in Gray Construction Co. v. Fantile, 62 S. D. 345, 253 N. W.

464 (1934).

^'Levy, Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Stock (193o) 15 Minn. L. Rev. 1.
- "Conversion into bonds is a decrease of capital." See In Re Phoenix Hotel Co.
of Lexington, Ky., 83 F. (2d) 724 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936).
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ment. 4. Suppose the charter contract insures to holders of so-called
non-cumulative preferred shares, dividend credits for passed-over years
if earned. Do the holders of these securities get dividend credits for
earnings which only go to decrease a capital deficit? The answer is no.2 8
5. May dividends be paid out of reduction-surplus? The answer is yes,
if the net assets exceed capital as reduced.
In the law of bankruptcy and fraudulent conveyances, we concern
ourselves continually with the problem of solvency, but in the law of
corporate finance we more frequently are concerned with whether an
excess of net assets over capital exists. In view of the foregoing, it seems
to the writer that the dividend section of the Virginia corporation
statute should be amended in such manner as to prohibit payment of
dividends except out of net assets in excess of capital.
This brings us to the second problem: what constitutes capital under Virginia law. There is no use talking about maintaining a fixed
capital unless the ascertainment of the exact amount of it can be precisely determined. How do we calculate its money value? How do we
arrive at the numerical figure to be subtracted from the figure standing
for net assets in order to get the surplus figure? The statute (omitting
problems concerned with legal increases and legal reductions pursuant
to Section 3781) defines capital,. in Section 3840,29 in terms of "the sum
of the consideration received in payment for the shares (whether with
or without par value)." Section 3840 does not, in so many words, de-

fine capital as the sum of the money values of the considerations received in payment for the shares. The words are "the sum of the consideration." Since a verbal property description cannot be subtracted
from a numerical figure standing for net assets, we must look beyond
Section 3840 for the method of finding the exact amount of money
value which constitutes capital. Virginia's definition of capital is of a
vague, out-moded type.
Mr. George S. Hills, of New York, writing in the Harvard Law Review, 3 0 in discussing definition of capital under the early statutes, says:

"Capital has been variously defined in terms of property and consideration received for the shares ....The more modern laws contain a clear

definition of capital. In composite, modern laws fix the amount of legal or stated capital of a corporation at any particular time as follows:
'the sum of the aggregate par value of all shares having par value plus
2'National Newark & Essex Banking Co. v. Durant Motor Co., 124 N. J. Eq.
213, 1 A. (2d) 316 (1938).

"Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 3840.
"°Hills, Model Corporation Act (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1334.
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the aggregate amount of consideration received for all issued shares
without par value, except such part thereof as may have been allocated
to paid-in surplus'... (plus legal increases and minus legal reductions) ....

[Having] been established, legal capital crystallizes into an

amount, a quantum and not a res, which remains constant unless or
until it is increased or reduced in a manner expressly required or
permitted by statute." Thus under modern statutes, a corporation
which has issued iooo shares of $ioo par value plus io,ooo shares of no
par value, for which it has received $1o a share, is capitalized at $2oo,ooo. In Virginia the multiple of the so-called par value of the par
shares times the number of par shares has nothing to do with the fixing
of capital, nor does the actual value of the consideration received for
the no-par shares have any bearing. Virginia has her own unique
system of fixing the quantum or amount which constitutes capital. For
lack of an established term, we may describe the Virginia rule as a recorded valuation rule. Making allowance for the inaccuracy inherent
in all over-simplification, we may say that the Virginia statute apparently requires that a corporation's capital must be centrally recorded in
terms of dollars and cents with the State Corporation Commission. If
a corporation has issued looo shares of so-called ioo par stock and takes
from the subscribers property, services and money estimated by the
board of directors to be worth only $5o,ooo and the officers have recorded the $5o,ooo valuation with the S.C.C. in the form and manner
required by statute, then the corporation's capital apparently becomes
$5o,ooo and not $ioo,ooo. If the expression "$ioo par" has any useful meaning in Virginia law, it does not have the usual effect in fixing
capital. In Monk v. Barnett3 l the court said: "All persons contracting
with corporations chartered in this state must look to the records of
the State Corporation Commission as to the character, location and
value of the assets of the corporation." In Monk v. Barnett the subscribers issued to themselves stock of the aggregate par value of $40,000
for properties upon which they themselves placed a value of $4,000. In
subsequent insolvency, the court held that the subscribers were not
liable to creditors for so much of the difference between the $40,000
and the $4,ooo as should be necessary to pay unsatisfied creditors. The
subscribers had complied with the statutes of Virginia by filing their
valuation with the S.C.C., together with the description of the property
in the manner prescribed. Although Section 384032 of the statute is
rather vague in defining capital in terms of the "sum of the considera3Monk v. Barnett, xi3 Va. 635, 75 S. E. 185 (1911).

uVa. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 3840.
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tion," Section 3788, 33 in pursuance of a mandate of Section 167 of the
Constitution, prescribes that an estimated valuation of the aggregate
value of the consideration be filed with the S.C.C. in the form and manner required by the S.C.C., and the S.C.C. requires a precise valuation
in terms of amount of money values of the considerations in dollars
and cents.
It has been argued by persons who find it difficult to understand
how radically the Virginia capital theory differs from the conventional
theory, that a Virginia corporation is launched with a capital deficit
whenever the recorded valuation is less than the aggregate par value of
the par stock. "Suppose," they argue, "that a Virginia corporation is
launched with ooo shares of $ioo par value stock and that the recorded valuation of the consideration for the stock is only $50,00o;
doesn't the corporation begin life with a capital deficit? Will it not be
necessary for the corporation to earn more than $50,00o before showing a surplus available for dividends?" The answer seems to be no, because the corporation's capital is really $5o,ooo and not $ioo,ooo under
Virginia statute law.1 4 A Virginia corporation could be launched with
a capital deficit if the actual value of the property received for the
stock was less than the recorded value thereof.
It should also be noted at this point that the organizers are required
to record a valuation of the considerations received for the so-called
no-par stock as well as the so-called par stock, and that this becomes a
part of the capital under the definition of Section 3840. If a Virginia
corporation issues iooo shares of so-called no-par stock for a recorded
consideration value of $io,ooo or $1o per share, assuming there are no
other shares, then the capital becomes $io,ooo. Though erroneously
called "no-par" stock, the shares upon analysis appear to be in reality
a stated value stock, or to use the self-disputing form of expression frequently encountered, the stock is "stated value no-par stock." We may
also observe that a $io stated-value share is the equivalent of a $1o low
par share. It thus appears that there is no such thing as true par stock
under Virginia corporation law; nor is there any such thing as true
no-par stock. All stock in Virginia is in effect stated-value stock or stock
"Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 3788.
"Formerly the New York rule as to liability of subscribers was much the same
as the Virginia rule. See Christman v. Eno, io6 N. Y. 97, 12 N. E. 648 (1887) and
Southworth v. Morgan, 205 N. Y. 293, 98 N. E. 490 (19i2). A subscriber who agreed
to pay $50 for a $1oo par share and who had paid only $25 or $25 worth was liable
to creditors for $25 and not $75. This rule has been changed by statute in New York,
bringing New York in line with other states, See New York Stock Corporations Law,
§ 69.
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of centrally recorded valuation. It is difficult to see what useful purpose
is served by maintaining a distinction between par and no-par, so long
as both are stated value stocks.
As a result of Virginia's having a unique capital theory which,
strangely enough, permits the recorded capital figure to be lower than
the result of the par value times the number of par shares, the story has
gotten around that Virginia has no definite figure for capital. The Virginia statute, however, does, as the writer reads the statute, fix a precise figure for capital. "... the sum of the money values of the consid-

erations received for the shares as valued and recorded with the S.C.C."
This may be $5o,ooo, when other states might fix capital at $ioo,ooo
because iooo shares of so-called $ioo par value have been issued. Although we must admit that capital is only $5o,ooo, Virginia could keep
that amount of capital intact, and hold that the company has a $25,000
capital deficit when it has only $25,ooo net assets left. Rights of creditors, protection of liquidation preferences, prevention of dilution of
value of one class of stock by another class, and the solution of many
other practical problems require that a corporation should have a
fixed quantity of money's worth of capital which does not shrink as
assets dwindle away. The statute should be amended so as to permit
dividend payments from only one source-"net assets in excess of capital." If the Riely case stirs up enough interest to cause Virginia lawyers
to reread the statute thoughtfully and critically, this decision of the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals may turn out to be a blessing
in disguise. The whole patchwork of the statute needs a general overhauling.
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In Memoriam

RAYMON T. JOHNSON
Raymon T. Johnson, Professor of Law in Washington and Lee University, died on March 25, 1948, at the age of 5o.
Born in Minorsville, Kentucky, in 1897, Professor Johnson received
the A.B. degree from the University of Kentucky in 1922 and the J.D.
degree from the University of Chicago in 1925, where he made an excellent record as a law student and as a member of the debating team.
He joined the Law Faculty of Washington and Lee University in the
Fall of 1925. Except for two short periods of law practice-one year in
Louisville, Kentucky and two years in the legal department of R.C.A.Victor-Professor Johnson spent his whole professional life at Washington and Lee.
Commencing his career as a law teacher at the age of 27, he was regarded by his students as an outstanding teacher from the beginning.
He combined clarity and force in presenting his material with a quick
wit and lovable personality. He gave unsparingly of his time and effort toward the establishment of the Washington and Lee Law Review
in 1939; he served with marked distinction in a difficult assignment as
member of an investigating committee of the Association of American
Law Schools; and a few days before his death, he was elected to membership in: the American Law Institute.
The Editors of the Law Review mourn the loss of a colleague and
friend.
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THE LAW SCHOOL
The School of Law of Washington and Lee University opened its
iooth session on October 14, 1948. On this date the School returned to
the two-semester academic year, with beginning students admitted at
both Fall and Spring Semesters.
Final registration for the Fall Semester, 1948 totalled 232, divided as
follows:
1st Year, ist Semester ......
.oo
2d Year, 3 d Semester ......
31
23
4 th Semester ......
55
3 d Year, 5 th Semester ......
6th Semester ......
23
Of the total Fall enrollment 2o9 students were veterans. All candidates
for the degree of Bachelor of Laws had completed at least one-half of
the requirements for a collegiate Bachelor's degree; ioo held a collegiate degree at the time of admission; 21 received a collegiate degree
under the combined programs in Arts and Law or Commerce and Law;
and 36 had completed at least three years of college work.
The permanent Law Faculty during the year 1948-49 includes Dean
Clayton E. Williams, Professors Charles R. McDowell and Charles P.
Light, Jr. and Associate Professors Charles V. Laughlin and Theodore
A. Smedley. Miss Wanda Lee Spears, B.A., LL.B. was appointed Law
Librarian and Mrs. C. R. McDowell continues as Law School Secretary. Mr. Carter Glass, III, of the Lynchburg Bar, continues to serve as
Lecturer on Taxation, and Mr. William L. Martin, of the Roanoke
Bar, as Lecturer on Virginia Procedure.
The late Professor Raymon T. Johnson's courses for the Spring
Term, 1948, were completed by Messrs. Carter Glass, III, LL.B., LL.M.,
Joseph E. Blackburn, B.A., LL.B., and Paul M. Shuford, B.S., LL.B.
During the Fall Semester, 1948, Mr. Edward S. Graves, M.A., LL.B.,
served as Lecturer on Domestic Relations and Mr. Wilson F. Miller,
B.S., LL.B., as Lecturer on Criminal Law. Mr. Blackburn will continue
during the Spring Semester, 1949, as Lecturer on Conflict of Laws.
Mr. Joseph H. Wolfe, B.S,, J.D., presently Cook Fellow at the University of Michigan Law School, has been appointed Assistant Professor of Law commencing with the Fall Semester, 1949.
The value of the Menkemeller Memorial Law Scholarships has
been increased, commencing 1949-50, to $1350.00 for the six semesters

of law study. These scholarships are offered to graduates of approved
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colleges who are beginning the study of law. They are awarded on the
basis of character, high scholastic attainment, and promise of future
usefulness in the legal profession. Financial need is given consideration. A Menkemeller Scholarship will continue for the three years of
law study, provided the holder maintains the standards set by the Law
Faculty. The stipend is payable in the amount of $225.oo each semester, commencing 1949-50, which is equivalent to the total of all University fees for a semester.
The iooth anniversary of the establishment of the School of Law
will be commemorated, during the Bicentennial of the University, by
the inauguration of the John Randolph Tucker Memorial Lectures on
May io and 11, 1949. The honorable John W. Davis, a distinguished
member of the Law Class of 1895, is the Lecturer and has chosen as
his subject: John Randolph Tucker-the Man and His Work. The
first lecture will be delivered in Lee Chapel at 8:oo p.m., May ioth,
and the second lecture at a Convocation in the Chapel at 12:oo noon,
May iith. The Law School Faculties in Virginia and neighboring
states, members of the bar and alumni of the University will be invited
to attend.
Members of the Law Faculty attended the Southern Law Review
Conference at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in April, 1948; the meeting
of the American Law Institute at Washington, D. C., in June, 1948;
the Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit at Asheville, N. C., also
in June, 1948; the annual meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association at White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., in August, 1948; the winter
meeting of the Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar
at Richmond in December, 1948, as guests of the University of Richmond School of Law; and the annual meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools at Cincinnati, Ohio, also in December, 1948.
The School of Law was host to the June, 1948, meeting of the Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar. The meeting
was held in Tucker Hall and was attended by the Board of Bar Examiners and by members of the Law Faculties of the University of
Virginia, the University of Richmond, the College of William and
Mary and.Washington and Lee University.
At the August, 1948, meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association, Dean Clayton E. Williams was elected to the Executive Committee, and Professor Charles R. McDowell was elected a Vice-President
and reappointed Chairman of the Committee on Uniform State Laws.
Professor Charles P. Light, Jr., completed his term as chairman of the
Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar and was reappointed member of the Committee on Administrative Law.
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Professor Theodore A. Smedley was elected Chairman of the Southern Law Review Conference for 1949.

The legal fraternities were active during 1948 in behalf of the entire School and their own membership. Tucker Inn of Phi Delta Phi
and Staples Chapter of Phi Alpha Delta jointly presented an orientation program for first year law students, consisting of four lectures
given at the beginning of the Fall Semester, 1948. Phi Alpha Delta
sponsored a legal writing contest, with a prize of $50.00 in books, open
to all law students except members of the Law Review staff. Six lectures on Legal Ethics were given for law students in November, 1948,
by members of Phi Delta Phi. The lectures covered the field of ethical
and moral responsibilities of the lawyer in his profession. A running
docket of proceedings in the courts of Rockbridge County was prepared by Tucker Inn and posted on the bulletin board for the information of the law student body.
Speakers who addressed meetings of Phi Alpha Delta during the
year were: Dean F. D. G. Ribble of the University of Virginia Law
School, Mr. John L. Walker of the Roanoke Bar and Past President
of the Virginia State Bar Association, Mr. Paul A. Holstein of the
Lexington Bar, Congressman James E. Noland of Indiana, and Professor Charles P. Light, Jr., of the Law Faculty. Meetings of Phi Delta
Phi were addressed by President Walker of the State Bar Association,
Mr. Holstein, State Senator Earl Fitzpatrick of the Roanoke Bar,
Colonel Francis Pickens Miller of Albermarle, Judge Floridus S. Crosby of the 18th Judicial Circuit, Superintendent Blalock of the Virginia
Hospital for the Criminal Insane at Marion, Mr. Richard D. Auerbach, Head Agent of the F. B. I. for the Richmond area, Mr. Edward
Osborne, Director, Federal Juvenile Detention Camp, Mr. Massie
Yuille of Lynchburg and Mr. John Fishwick of the Legal Department,
Norfolk and Western Railroad, Roanoke. During March and April
four of the Democratic candidates for Governor of Virginia were
brought to Lexington to speak under the auspices of the fraternity.
The Howard-Rogers Legal Society, composed of law students from
West Virginia, invited to the School as speakers Mr. E. B. Pennybacker,
West Virginia Compensation Commissioner, and Mr. Charles E. Mahan of the West Virginia Bar (Fayetteville).
Informal graduation -exercises were held -for the mid-year class of
1949 on February 14 th, in Washington Chapel. The graduates were
presented by Dean Williams to President Gaines who announced the
award of the Bachelor of Laws degrees. The address was delivered by
Justice Buchanan of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

